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RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES ON THE WELL SITE
Douglas M. Carson
DAILY, WEST, CORE, COFFMAN & CANFIELD 
Fort Smith, Arkansas
Introduction. This paper considers three basic areas of law which may become 
involved when a person suffers a physical injury on an oil or gas well site. The first area 
considers the basic tort liabilities and defenses which may arise. But parties involved in the 
drilling and operating end of the oil and gas business frequently carry liability insurance to 
protect against tort claims. The second portion of this paper therefore considers issues 
which may arise relating to insurance coverage of claims. Finally, usually the direct 
employer of the injured person is immune from tort liability and the employee’s remedy is 
limited to workers’ compensation. That is the last major topic.
This paper presents only an overview of a number of important issues which may 
arise in the personal injury claim or lawsuit. The potential tort, insurance, and workers’ 
compensation laws which may apply in any given case arise from such extensive, well- 
developed bodies of law that this paper should be viewed as stating general principles only. 
Accordingly, when analyzing the issues involved in an actual claim or lawsuit, primary 
legal sources should be consulted and relied on.
PART 1: TORT LIABILITY 
I. TORT LIABILITY DEFINED.
Tort liability is generally defined as a liability imposed by law for causing injury to 
or death of another person or damage to or destruction of another’s property. Tort law is 
often contrasted to contract law. Contractual liability arises out of a duty which one has 
agreed to assume, either expressly or by implication either arising from conduct indicating 
the existence of an agreement, or from some relation or dealing between the parties which 
the law finds sufficient to assume agreement existed. In contrast, tort liability is imposed
by law, in the absence of any specific agreement by the defendant to be liable. Part of this 
topic, however, considers the effec t of one pa rty ’s agreeing to be responsible for another 
p a rty ’s tort liability  under an indem nity contract or similar agreement.
For nonlawyers reviewing this paper, a "tortfeasor" is a party  who commits, or at 
least is legally responsible for, an act which causes an injury giving rise to a tort liability. 
An in jured  party  who files a lawsuit becomes a "plaintiff" and the tortfeasor becomes the 
"defendant. "
II.  INTENTIONAL TORTS.
A. G eneral.
An in ten tional to rt is a liability  imposed by law for an act which the tortfeasor 
in tended to do. For tort law purposes, the actor "intends" the consequences of his act if  
e ither his goal is to bring about the consequence or there is a substantial certain ty  that these 
consequences will result from  his intended act.
Common in ten tional torts include assault, battery, trespass to land, and trespass to 
chattels (tangible personal property). The im portant point is that the legal meaning of 
"intent" includes simply an in tent to do the act and is not limited to an in tent to cause the 
harm.
B. Agency Issues.
This topic is discussed in detail in the "negligence" section of this paper. For present 
purposes, it is im portan t to understand  tha t a person who is legally liable for another 
person’s conduct, such as an employer or principal in a principal-agent relationship, can be 
liable even for the employee’s or agent’s in tentional torts if  the in tentional tort in some way 
related to or arose out of the employer’s or princ ipal’s business. The key point is that the 
employer or principal did not have to authorize, order, or even know the intentional tort
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was being committed if  it arose out of the pursuit of the business.
For example, if  a f ight broke out on a well site, an employer or principal could be 
liable for the employee’s or agent’s beating up or killing another well hand or the land 
owner if  the cause of the problem or altercation was connected with the well site operations. 
In perhaps the most extreme example of how truly far-reaching this principle can extend, a 
court held a delivery service liable to a female customer who was raped by a delivery man. 
When the delivery man showed up to deliver furn iture , a dispute arose between the delivery 
man and the customer over whether he was required to haul the fu rn itu re  upstairs or only 
deliver it to the fron t door. The argument became heated, turned violent, and the delivery 
man raped the customer. There was no claim that the employer in any way authorized, 
instructed, or even should have foreseen the rape because of the delivery man’s past history. 
Nevertheless, the employer was held civilly liable to the customer for the rape (a form of 
the intentional tort of battery). Lyon v. Carey. 533 F.2d 649 (D. C. Cir. 1976).
III.  NEGLIGENCE.
A. D efin ition .
A p la in t if f ’s prima facie case for negligence requires proving (a) a duty of the 
defendant to conform to a specific standard of conduct to protect the p la in t if f  against an 
unreasonable risk of injury; (b) the defendant’s breach of that duty; (c) that the breach of 
the duty was the actual and proximate cause of the injury; and (d) damage as a result of the 
breach of that duty.
In a negligence case, the general duty of the defendant is to act as a reasonable, 
ordinary, prudent person would under the same or similar circumstances. If the defendant 
is engaged in some profession requiring special skills or knowledge (such as drilling a gas 
well or practicing medicine), then the defendan t’s conduct is measured against the actions
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of a reasonable person practicing that profession or performing that specialized job.
B. To Whom Is the Duty Owed?
A duty of care generally is owed only to reasonably foreseeable plaintiffs. It is not 
necessary, however, that the defendant foresee harm to the specific p la in tif f  or even know 
that the p la in tif f  existed at the time of the act if  injury to a person in the p la in t if f ’s 
situation was reasonably foreseeable. For example, incorrectly performed seismic testing 
proximately causing a worsening of ground water quality potentially could allow any 
landowner affected  by the change in water quality to maintain a lawsuit, even if that 
landowner did not own the land on which the seismic testing was done and even if the 
defendant did not know that particular p la in tiff  existed.
C. Rules Relating to Owners and Occupiers of Land.
If  someone else, such as a gas well operator drilling pursuant to the lease, is lawfully 
occupying the owner’s land, the duty of care to avoid injury to others is placed upon that 
occupant. Arkansas maintains the distinction between trespassers, licensees, and invitees 
and the duty  owed to each.
1. Trespassers.
Under Arkansas law, an owner, lessee, or occupant of property owes a trespasser no 
duty until the trespasser’s presence on the premises is known. Once the trespasser’s presence 
is known, the owner or occupant owes the trespasser only a duty not to cause him injury by 
willful or wanton conduct. Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-108.
An exception to this rule exists for child trespassers under the "attractive nuisance 
doctrine. " The landowner or occupant has the duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid 
reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to children caused by artificia l conditions on the
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property. The "attractive nuisance" doctrine involves cases in which the owner or occupier 
of the land knows or should know that young persons frequent the vicinity of the 
dangerous condition, that the condition or activity is likely to a ttract a child’s interest or 
attention, and that the condition is likely to cause injury, particularly  because of the child’s 
inability  to appreciate the risk. It is easy to conceive of a court declaring drilling 
operations to be an a ttractive  nuisance and to f ind  the operator or the various companies 
involved in drilling activities liable for injury to a child under the "attractive nuisance 
doctrine. "
2. Licensees.
A licensee is a person on the land, with the owner or occupier’s express or implied 
permission, for the licensee’s personal benefit and not the owner or occupier’s benefit. For 
example, a traveling salesman who is on the property for the purpose of attem pting a sale is 
a licensee if  he or she is there with the owner or occupier’s permission.
The owner or occupier owes the licensee no duty until the licensee’s presence is 
known; then the owner or occupier owes the licensee a duty not to cause injury by willful or 
wanton conduct, but if  the licensee is in a position of danger, the owner or occupier must 
use ordinary  care to avoid injuring the licensee.
3. Invitees.
An invitee is one who is on the premises for a purpose connected with the owner or 
occupant’s business or for a purpose connected with an activity from which the owner or 
occupant expects to receive a benefit. For example, all of the subcontractors hired by an oil 
or gas well operator on the premises pursuant to a lease ordinarily  would be invitees.
A defendant owes an invitee a duty to use ordinary  care to m aintain the premises in 
a reasonably safe condition or to otherwise use ordinary  care for the invitee’s safety.
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4. States Other Than Arkansas.
A number of states have abolished the trespass/licensee/invitee distinctions and hold 
that the owner or occupier owes everyone on the premises a duty  of ordinary care to refrain  
from causing injury. Arkansas, as noted, still maintains the three-part distinction.
5. The General Rules as Applied and R efined in Specific 
Cases.
(a) Unsafe Condition of the Premises.
The operator can have a duty  either to keep the premises safe for employees of the 
subcontractors or to warn of dangerous conditions. For example, in Sun Oil Co. v. Massey. 
594 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) writ re f ’d n.r.e. [writ for fu r ther  appeal refused on the 
basis tha t the interm ediate appellate decision contained no reversible error], an employee of 
an independent contractor reworking an oil well was electrocuted. He was killed when a 
guy wire came into contact with a power line. The jury found that in the process of 
reworking the well Sun Oil had created a dangerous condition which it knew or should have 
known about and, accordingly, tha t Sun Oil failed to make the premises reasonably safe for 
the subcontractor’s employee. The Texas Court of Appeals a ff irm ed  a jury verdict for the 
p la in tif f ,  holding that Sun had a legal duty to protect the subcontractor’s employee by 
taking the reasonably available steps of either relocating the lines or shutting o ff  the power.
Liability  for "failure to warn" was imposed in Gutierrez v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 399 
(5th Cir. 1985). In that case, Exxon hired Johnson Tool Company to cut and cap an 
abandoned well. The subcontractor used a "window technique" which caused a tremendous 
downward pressure by the inner casing on the outer casing. The p la in tiff ,  an employee of 
Johnson Tool, was cutting the inner casing when the outer casing collapsed from the weight 
and in jured the p la in tiff .  The jury  concluded that Exxon knew that the outer casing could 
not support the inner casing a f te r  the "windows" were cut. The appellate court affirm ed,
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ruling that Exxon had a duty to warn of dangerous conditions that it knew or should have 
known existed if the danger was not reasonably apparent to persons such as Johnson Tool 
and its employees.
Gutierrez is interesting because the court treated it as a "premises defect" case 
although the premises, specifically the gas well, were not in a dangerous condition until the 
subcontractor began its welding and cutting operations. Nevertheless, because the "window 
technique" had been used on approximately 200 Exxon wells, the court concluded that 
Exxon should have been aware of the danger the technique created.
(b) Dangerous Conditions Arising Out of the 
Work Performed by an Independent 
Contractor.
In general, the duty to furnish a safe place to work or to protect 
trespassers/licensees/invitees from harm is qualified by the rule that one who engages an 
independent contractor to do the work is not liable for hazards that arise out of or are 
incidental to the work which the independent contractor was hired to perform.
(1) Arkansas Cases.
In Arkansas it is a firmly-established rule that a defendant is not liable for the torts
of an independent contractor. As the Arkansas Supreme Court expressly declared:
An employer of an independent contractor is not liable for the 
independent contractor’s torts which are committed in the 
performance of the contracted work.
Blankenship v. Overholt. 301 Ark. 476, 478, 786 S.W.2d 814, 815 (1990).
The court in Blankenship considered the varied factors that are considered in 
determining whether a tortfeasor is an independent contractor or a servant/employee.
These include the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may impose over 
the details of the work; whether the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
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business; the kind of occupation; the skill required; the identity of the person furnishing
the instruments, tools, and place of work; the length of time for which the person is
employed; the method of payment; whether or not the work is part of the regular business
of the employer; whether the parties believe they are creating a master-servant or
independent contractor relationship; and whether the principal is engaged in business. Of
all these factors, the extent of control is the principal factor in defining the relationship.
Id. at 479, 786 S.W.2d at 815. The court in Blankenship then summarized the rule:
By a long line of decisions this court is committed to the 
universal rule, that where the contractor is to produce a certain 
result, according to specific and definite contractual directions, 
agreed upon and made a part of the contract, and the duty of 
the contractor is to produce the net result by means and 
methods of his own choice, and the owner is not concerned with 
the physical conduct of either the contractor or his employees, 
then the contract does not create the relation of master and 
servant. This court has consistently accepted and stated the 
settled rule that even though control and direction be retained 
by the owner, the relation of master and servant is not thereby 
created unless such control and direction relate to the physical 
conduct of the contractor in the performance of the work with 
respect to the details thereof.
Id. at 479-80, 786 S.W.2d at 816.
The rule is perhaps most succinctly stated in the Arkansas Model Instruction on this
point:
An independent contractor is one who, in the course of his 
independent occupation, is responsible for the performance of 
certain work, uses his own methods to accomplish it, and is 
subject to the control of the employer only as to the result of 
his work.
AMI 707.
In Blankenship, the court reviewed the facts and concluded that the employer "was 
not concerned with the physical conduct of the contractor. Instead, he was concerned with 
the result. " Id. at 480, 786 S.W.2d at 816. This meant that the defendant-employer was not 
liable for the p la in tiff’s damages. Even the fact that the employer specified that a certain 
type of bracing would be employed in doing that particular work was not sufficient,
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because tha t was not supervision of the work but ra ther a specification of the result to be 
obtained. Accordingly, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the verdict against the master 
and dismissed him from  the case.
Some Arkansas au thority  indicates tha t the general con tractor’s re ta in ing  of the 
right to monitor the progress of the drilling  project is not dispositive. The rationale is that 
anybody who hires an independent contractor may and should retain  the right to approve 
the work perform ed. As a federal d is tric t court applying Arkansas law has held, "The right 
to approve or reject the result of the work does not destroy the independent contractor 
relationship." Wright v. Newm an. 539 F. Supp. 1331, 1338-39 (W.D. Ark. 1982).
(2) Texas Cases.
Texas, unlike Arkansas, has produced a number of reported decisions involving
personal in juries in oil and gas operations. Many of these decisions deal with the varying
duties of d if fe ren t  parties involved in the operation when the in ju ry  or death  occurred. In
Texas, earlier cases suggested that the operator has no duty  to warn or protect a
subcontractor from  dangerous conditions created by the subcontractor. For example, in
Abalos v. Oil Development Co. of Texas. 544 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1976), the p la in t i f f  sued the
defendan t fo r injuries sustained while working on the d e fen d an t’s lease in the employ of an
independent contractor. The facts indicate that an employee of the de fendan t was aware of
the danger created by the subcontractor’s acts but did not take any immediate action. The
p la in t i f f  was caught and severely in jured  in the dangerous machinery. The subcontrac tor’s
employee sued the operator on the theory tha t the opera tor’s employee owed a duty  to warn
the p la in t i f f  or to stop the pump. The Texas Supreme Court a ff irm ed  a d e fen d an t’s motion
for instructed verdict, concluding:
[W]here the activ ity  is conducted by, and is under the control 
of, an independent contractor, and where the danger arises out 
of the activ ity  s ta ff ,  the responsibility or duty  is tha t of the 
independent contractor, and not tha t of the owner of the
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premises.
Id. at 631. Significantly, the defendant’s employee had not merely noticed the danger but 
had assisted the subcontractor by starting the pump which caused the injury. Nevertheless, 
the operator was relieved of liability because the p la in t if f ’s employer, who was the 
operator’s subcontractor, maintained direction and control of the entire activity which 
caused the injury.
The operator was found liable in Remuda Oil & Gas Co. v. Nobles. 613 S.W.2d 312 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1981) no w rit . In that case, Remuda hired Nobles to flow back an oil well. 
During the course of performing the work, Nobles was struck by an unsecured flow line. 
Significantly, Nobles told a Remuda representative that the method being used was 
dangerous and the Remuda supervisor told Nobles to use the procedure, despite Nobles’ 
misgivings. In this case, the court disregarded the general rule shielding the employer of an 
independent contractor from liability and held that the operator was liable. The rationale 
was that the activity  which injured the p la in tiff  was performed pursuant to procedures 
specifically mandated or required by the operator. Furthermore, the operator’s employee on 
the site told the other contractors on the site that he (as the operator’s representative) was 
"in charge." The court reasoned that the operator should be held liable because it actively 
in terfered with the contractor’s work.
An interesting case representing some sort of a mid-point between Abalos and 
Remuda is Tanner v, BD & K Production Co., 671 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. App. 1984) no writ. In 
that case, the court held that the operator’s employee had not become so involved in the 
subcontractor’s work as to impose liability on the operator even though the operator’s 
employee specifically instructed the BD & K tool pusher to "hurry up. " The court 
concluded that simply trying to keep things on schedule was not sufficient interference 
with the subcontractor’s work so as to make the operator responsible for the injury.
If  interference with the contractor can make the operator liable, then "joint control"
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over the operation or a portion of the operation also can make the operator liable. In Shell 
Oil Co. v. Waxler, 652 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. App. 1983) writ re f ’d n.r.e., a near-stampede of 
employees at a large refinery  trying to leave work through a narrow gate injured the 
p la in tiff ,  who was an employee of an independent contractor doing construction work at a 
refinery. The court concluded that both the project owner and the contractor were jointly 
liable in part because Shell employed a safety representative to insure that Shell's 
contractors were perform ing their jobs safely. In addition, Shell’s security guards were 
responsible for opening and closing the gate where the p la in tif f  was injured. The court 
could have aff irm ed  the verdict for the injured worker simply on the ground that Shell 
maintained actual physical control over the gate. The court went beyond that rationale, 
however, noting that Shell had a safety representative whose job included insuring that the 
contractors performed their duties safely.
The court seemed to extend the decision in Waxier by finding an a ff irm ative  duty 
on the part of the operator to in terfere with the subcontractors in Tovar v. Amarillo Oil 
Co., 692 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1985). In that case, the court found that the operator knew of the 
subcontractor’s deviation from standard procedures and knew the deviation could be 
dangerous, but did not in terfere  with the work of the contractor. The contract between the 
operator and the subcontractor, however, gave the operator the right to shut down the 
operation in the event of carelessness, inattention, or incompetency by the subcontractor. 
The court concluded that this right to shut down the operation, coupled with the operator’s 
knowledge of the danger, amounted to a duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising the 
activity and protecting subcontractors’ employees on the job site.
Supervising safety was even taken to a greater extent in Exxon Corp. v. Roberts. 724 
S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App. 1986) writ re f ’d n.r.e. In that case, two independent contractors were 
working on an Exxon lease to raise some casing tools from the ground to the rig floor. An 
employee of one of the contractors was killed. The court concluded that Exxon was liable
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under the facts because Exxon exercised control over the procedures used and, further, did 
not hold a safety meeting and did not require the injured employee’s contractor to hold a 
safety meeting. The court specifically held that "the absence of a rule requiring such 
meetings could be negligence and proximate cause in a case of this type. " Id. at 868.
The operator is not always liable in Texas, however. In Shell Oil Co. v. Songer. 710 
S.W.2d 615 (Tex. App. 1986) writ re f ’d n.r.e., Shell hired electricians as independent 
contractors. One of the subcontractor’s employees received a severe electrical shock. On 
appeal, the court reversed an assignment of 50 percent of the negligence to Shell. The court 
concluded tha t the electrical work being done was a specialized activity and that the 
p la in t i f f ’s employer (the subcontractor) was in a superior position to oversee the work and 
eliminate the dangerous condition. Thus, if  the dangerous condition is in a sufficiently  
specialized area and the operator makes no attempt to control the work being done in that 
area, then the operator may still be found not liable.
The overall impact of these decisions seems to be to set up a rule where the operator 
is in a better legal position not to concern itself with safety considerations. Although 
Songer did still recognize an operator’s nonliability, the cases holding the operator liable are 
troubling. The message of the Texas opinions, taken as a whole, seems to be that the 
operator can best protect itself by making no safety requirements, not involving itself in the 
subcontracted activities, and not concerning itself with the safety of its subcontractors at 
all. The more involved the operator becomes in safety considerations, the more likely the 
operator is to be found liable to an injured employee on the ground that it exercised joint 
control over the subcontracted work.
It should be the policy of the law to encourage activities which will reduce the 
number of deaths and injuries, not simply add to the list of defendants who can be sued 
when an accident occurs. U nfortunately , in Texas an operator who is overly concerned 





Strict liability exists in Arkansas by statute. In Arkansas, a "supplier" of a product is 
subject to liability for harm to a person or property if  (1) the supplier is engaged in the 
business of "manufacturing, assembling, selling, leasing, or otherwise distributing" the 
product, (2) the product is in a defective condition which renders it unreasonably 
dangerous, and (3) the defective condition is a proximate cause of the injury. Thus, if  an 
injury is caused either by a defectively designed or manufactured piece of equipment or by 
a defective installation of equipment, then the "supplier" of the product, which could 
include anybody involved in distributing the product from the original m anufacturer to the 
subcontractor who "supplies" the product at the well site, can be found liable.
The definition of "supplier" is decidedly broad. The author of this paper has been 
involved in or is aware of several severe injury lawsuits which involved an allegedly 
malfunctioning piece of drilling or production equipment. In each case, virtually every 
person or company (other than the p la in t if f ’s employer) who had anything to do with the 
allegedly defective equipment was sued as a "supplier. "
The product must be supplied in a "defective condition, " which is defined by statute 
as meaning "a condition of a product that renders it unsafe for reasonably foreseeable use 
and consumption. " Note that under this definition the use does not have to be that which 
was intended by the supplier, only that use which was "reasonably foreseeable. " Thus, a 
m anufacturer or supplier of a product has a duty under Arkansas law to guard against 
dangers which not only are inherent in the product’s intended use but which also may arise 
from any "reasonably foreseeable" use, whether the product is intended to be used that way 
or not.
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The defin ition  of "unreasonably dangerous" also is important. Under the statute, to
be "unreasonably dangerous" a product must be
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary and reasonable buyer, consumer 
or user who acquires or uses such product, assuming the 
ordinary  knowledge of the community, or of similar buyers, 
users or consumers, as to its characteristics, propensities, risks, 
dangers and proper and improper uses, as well as any special 
knowledge, training or experience possessed by the particular 
buyer, user or consumer or which he or she was required to 
possess. However, as to a minor, "unreasonably dangerous" 
means that a product is dangerous to an extent beyond that 
which would be contemplated by an ordinary and reasonably 
careful minor considering his age and intelligence.
Significantly, this defin ition recognizes that some products are intended to be used 
in specialized settings and operated by people with specialized knowledge. Thus, products 
which are used in connection with the drilling and producing of an oil or gas well must be 
evaluated not by the standard of whether they would be dangerous to the ordinary person 
but whether they are unreasonably dangerous to those well-site workers under their 
knowledge, training, experience, and reasonable contemplation.
B. Defenses.
The Arkansas Product Liability Act provides a number of statutory defenses. These 
include:
1. A three-year statute of limitations from the date on which the death, injury, 
or damage occurred. If the injured person is a minor, then the statute of limitations does 
not begin to run until that person reaches the age of majority or otherwise has their 
disability removed.
2. Compliance with any federal or state statute or administrative regulation 
existing at the time the product was m anufactured which prescribes standards of design, 
inspection, testing, m anufacture, labeling, warning, or instructions for use "shall be 
considered as evidence that a product is not in an unreasonably dangerous condition"
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insofar as the claims of defect were covered by the standards. Note that this is not an 
"absolute" defense, but merely a statement that this type of evidence "shall be considered as 
evidence. "
3. Supplying a product a fter its anticipated life may be considered a defense by 
the m anufacturer as between the m anufacturer and supplier if the product is supplied after 
the expiration date placed on the product by the m anufacturer as required by law. (In 
practical terms, this defense would have little application to oil and gas well site injuries, 
because the "expiration date" required by law usually applies only to food and drugs. ")
4. Use of a product beyond its anticipated life by a consumer when the 
consumer knew or should have known the anticipated life of the product. Again, this is not 
an absolute defense but merely one which "may be considered as evidence of fau lt on the 
part of the consumer. "
5. The jury may also consider the state of scientific and technical knowledge 
available to the m anufacturer or supplier at the time the product was placed on the market, 
rather than at the time of injury. This again is not an "absolute" defense, but merely 
recognizes the kind of evidence which may be placed before the jury. This defense does not 
apply to actions based on express warranties or misrepresentation regarding the product.
The rationale obviously is that a defendant should not be able to maintain that a certain 
design or m anufacturing feature was technically impossible at the time the product was 
manufactured if  the defendant was expressly stating that the safety feature existed on the 
particular product at issue.
6. If a product was not unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the control of 
the m anufacturer or supplier, but was made unreasonably dangerous by subsequent 
"unforeseeable alteration, change, improper maintenance, or abnormal use, " then that 
conduct may be considered as evidence of fault on the part of the user.
Note that the alteration must not merely make the product dangerous but it must be
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an "unforeseeable" alteration. There are many cases in the product liability field holding 
that the user’s removing of safeguards, lockout mechanisms, and other safety features did 
not prohibit recovery by the p la in tiff  if  removal of the safety feature made the product 
easier to operate and removal of that safety feature was reasonably foreseeable to the 
m anufacturer/supplier. This rule allowing an injured person to recover damages for an 
accident caused by a machine which has had safety features removed has been widely 
criticized, but it remains the law in most jurisdictions. Note that there may be a 
distinction, however, between the particular p la in tiff  being the person who actually 
removed the safety feature and a p la in tiff  who (especially if  on the job) uses a product 
which had safety features removed by the employer or some other employee. In the former 
situation, if  the person who is injured is the one who actually removed the safety device, 
then comparative fau lt principles (discussed below) may apply. On the other hand, if the 
p la in tif f  was merely required to use equipment which had been altered by some other 
employee or by the employer, then courts are much more reluctant to assess fault against the 
user-plaintiff.
7. Comparative fault. This is discussed in Section VI below.
V. ULTRAHAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES.
In Arkansas, ultrahazardous activities are limited to those which are uncommon and 
which involve a risk of personal injury or property damage which cannot be eliminated 
with the exercise of even utmost care. Typically, in Arkansas ultrahazardous activities are 
activities such as spraying poisonous chemicals and blasting. Other than seismic testing 
which may precede the drilling of a well, drilling an oil or gas well has not been declared 
an ultrahazardous activity in Arkansas because it can be done safely.
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VI. GENERAL TORT DEFENSES.
Although there may be any number of legal defenses to a particular action, such as 
the running of the statute of limitations, consent, license, waiver, accord and satisfaction, 
etc., the most relevant defense for present purposes is the defense of contributory or 
comparative fault. Arkansas has by statute enacted a comparative fau lt statute which 
provides that if  the p la in t i f f ’s fau lt is equal to or greater than the fau lt of all defendants, 
then the p la in tif f  cannot recover. In Oklahoma, in contrast, a p la in tif f  is not barred from 
recovery unless the p la in t if f ’s fau lt is greater than that of all defendants. In either state, 
the award of damages is reduced according to the percentage of comparative fault, up to 
the point where the degree of fau lt bars recovery completely. Due to the d ifference 
between Arkansas and Oklahoma, however, a p la in tif f  who is 50 percent at fau lt in 
Arkansas recovers nothing while a p la in tif f  who is 50 percent at fau lt in Oklahoma is 
entitled to recover one-half of the total damages.
When there are multiple defendants, the p la in t if f ’s fault is compared with that of all 
defendants, not each individually. For example, assume a jury found the p la in tif f  twenty 
percent at fault, defendant no. 1 ten percent at fault, and defendant no. 2 seventy percent 
at fault. In that situation the p la in t if f ’s recovery would be reduced twenty percent, but the 
p la in tif f  would still have a judgment for the remaining eighty percent of damages against 
both defendants. Defendant no. 1 does not escape a judgment simply because its share of 
fau lt is less than the p la in t if f ’s, because the total defendants’ share of fau lt is greater than 
the p la in t i f f ’s.
VII. AGENCY ISSUES: WHEN ONE IS LIABLE FOR ANOTHER’S ACTS.
As detailed previously in III.C.5. (b) of this paper, the classification of a person 
working on a gas well as an "agent" of the operator or an "independent contractor" working 
for the operator can have a substantial e ffect on the operator’s liability. Under general
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Arkansas law, a principal who commits no independent action creating a direct tort liability 
is legally responsible for the torts of an agent but not for the torts of an independent 
contractor.
An agent is a person who, with the consent of the principal, acts for the principal 
and is subject to the principal’s control. The agreement may be oral, written, or implied 
from the conduct of the parties. If the right to control exists at the time of the tortious 
conduct, then the principal-agent relationship, and the resulting transfer of liabilities, may 
exist at that time, even though the right of control may not have actually been exercised by 
the principal.
In contrast, an independent contractor is one who, in the course of his independent 
occupation, is responsible for the performance of certain work, uses his own methods to 
accomplish it, and is subject to the control of the employer only as to the result of the work.
VIII. CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY.
A. Overview: Distinguishing the Concepts and Summarizing the 
Rules.
"Contribution" is the legal right existing as a matter of law for one of several 
tortfeasors jointly responsible to the injured person to pay no more than its proportionate 
share of the damages by being reimbursed by other joint tortfeasors. Each "joint tortfeasor" 
individually or "severally" is responsible to the injured p la in tif f  for the entire judgment.
As between the joint tortfeasors, however, one who pays more than its apportioned share of 
the judgment is entitled to seek contribution from the underpaying defendant(s). See Ark. 
Code Ann. § 16-64-122.
In practical terms, for example, assume a jury verdict finds the p la in tiff  not at all at 
fau lt  (0%), defendant no. 1 is held one percent at fault, and defendant no. 2 is held ninety-
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nine percent at fault. If the defendant who is one percent at fault pays the faultless 
p la in tiff  the entire award, then that defendant is entitled to seek reimbursement 
("contribution") of 99 percent of the payment from the other defendant. If, however, the 
defendant who was 99 percent at fault has died, disappeared, gone out of business, or 
simply does not have the money, that is simply the "one percent defendant’s" tough luck.
"Indemnity, " in contrast, is a right existing by contract, or sometimes implied by law 
because of the parties’ business relationship, for one who has paid a settlement or judgment 
to a p la in tiff  to obtain complete (100 percent) repayment from another party. Without 
attempting to set forth exact language, indemnity provisions in written contracts often will 
state some or all of the following:
(1) The subcontractor is expressly deemed to be an independent contractor 
concerning all of the work within the scope of the contract.
(2) The contractor shall defend, indemnify, and hold the operator completely 
harmless from any type of loss, claim, expense, or demand, including attorney’s fees.
(3) The contractor will maintain insurance to protect the operator, including 
workmen’s compensation insurance, employer’s liability insurance, and comprehensive 
general liability insurance. Usually the providing of a certificate of insurance is required 
to establish compliance with the provision.
(4) It is not unusual for contracts to require the subcontractor to indemnify the 
operator for the total loss regardless of how fault for an injury to any third person is 
apportioned between the operator, subcontractor, and any other third  parties.
Many people, even many lawyers, often use the terms "contribution" and "indemnity" 
as if  they were either interchangeable terms or inextricably intertwined phrases in the same 
legal doctrine. They are not. "Contribution" is a tort law concept which grants repayment 
rights to one paying more than its apportioned share of liability. "Indemnity" is a 
contractual or quasi-contractual right to complete reimbursement.
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B. Claims Against Fellow Employees.
As will be discussed below, an employee’s exclusive remedy against his or her direct 
employer is workers* compensation, subject to a few limited exceptions. This means that an 
employee injured in the course of employment cannot ordinarily file a tort suit against his 
or her employer but can sue any non-employer tortfeasor who caused or contributed to the 
injury. Where one or more joint tortfeasors’ claims for contribution or indemnity from the 
employer are present, however, the situation, as discussed below, can become more complex.
This section is strictly concerned with claims for joint tortfeasor contribution, not 
express or implied contractual indemnity, from a fellow employee. The Arkansas Workers’ 
Compensation Act specifically provides that the rights and remedies granted to the 
employee "shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of such employee... to recover 
damages from such employer, or any principal, officer, director, stockholder, or partner 
acting in their capacity as an employer.... " Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105. In short, Arkansas 
employees ordinarily  cannot sue their employer for work-related injuries except to make a 
workers’ compensation claim.
Nevertheless, as detailed below, the Arkansas decisions have allowed tort suits 
against fellow employees in some cases and disallowed them in others. The cases can be 
resolved under the following rules:
(1) If the only negligence alleged against the fellow employee is negligence in 
failing to provide a safe place to work, then the workers’ compensation act immunity 
prohibits the suit against the th ird  party.
(2) If  the th ird-party  defendant is the owner of the corporate employer, manages 
the corporation, provides workers’ compensation insurance coverage, and the injury is in 
the scope of employment, then that person is in effect an "employer" under the act and 
therefore cannot be a "third party" so as to abrogate workers’ compensation immunity.
(3) Recent decisions indicate a more restrictive view of the right to pursue a
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claim against a corporate owner or manager individually than appeared in earlier decisions. 
If an employee is not an "alter ego" of the corporation or supervisory employee, then he may 
be sued for the negligent injury of a fellow employee, so long as the negligence is not the 
mere fa ilure  to provide a safe place to work.
(4) Notwithstanding the above rules, if the claim against the th ird-party  
employer is not that it is a joint tortfeasor but that it has an express or implied indemnity 
obligation to the th ird-party  p la in tiff ,  then the claim may proceed because the "exclusive 
remedy" provision does not apply to express or implied indemnity contracts, only tort 
claims.
Although cases in which the injured party is allowed to sue a co-employee for 
negligence are discussed below, Arkansas law firmly establishes that if the only negligence 
is the fa ilure  to provide a safe place to work, then workers’ compensation benefits provide 
the exclusive remedy. In the early leading case Neal v. Oliver. 246 Ark. 377, 438 S.W.2d 313 
(1969), the injured party sued the owner of her corporate employer, alleging negligence in 
assigning her to work on an unsafe machine. The trial court granted the de fendan t’s motion 
for summary judgment. Significantly, on appeal the Supreme Court noted that the alleged 
negligent act was the defendan t’s "failure to provide a safe place for her to work as 
required by state law. " Id. at 388, 438 S.W.2d at 319. The court noted that the defendant 
owned the entire corporate stock with his wife, was the manager of the corporate employer, 
provided workers’ compensation insurance coverage, and an employer-employee relationship 
existed between the p la in tif f  and defendant at the time of the injury. The court 
specifically concluded that the defendant and his wife "owned the corporate business and 
they, as well as the corporation, were the employers. " Id. at 387, 438 S.W.2d at 318. 
Accordingly, the court concluded that under these circumstances the defendant was not a 
"third party" separate from the employer and affirm ed  the summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant.
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Neal v. Oliver has been cited many times by later Arkansas appellate decisions in 
support of the proposition that an owner or supervisory employee ordinarily cannot be sued 
in tort for an injury covered by the workers’ compensation act. But a potentially 
significant fact mentioned by the Arkansas Supreme Court distinguishes Oliver from our 
situation. In the same paragraph in which the court noted that the employer had provided 
workers’ compensation insurance to the employee, the court noted that the p la in tif f  " was 
not injured by a direct negligent act of Oliver, he wasn’t even on the premises when the 
[p laintiff] was injured. " Id . at 388, 438 S.W.2d at 319. This dovetails with the court’s 
statement of law, summarizing a review of cases from across the country, that a president 
of a corporation or a business owner "may or may not" be an employee for workers’ 
compensation purposes, depending on each case’s facts. Id . at 387, 438 S.W.2d at 318.
The court’s partial reliance on the em ployer/defendant’s lack of involvement in the 
actual accident in Neal was disregarded in Morgan Construction Co. v. Larkan . 254 Ark. 
838, 496 S.W.2d 431 (1973). In that case a defendant prime contractor filed a third-party  
complaint against the owner of a subcontractor corporation seeking both contribution and 
indemnity. The prime contractor relied on the third-party  defendant’s alleged actual and 
a ff irm ative  negligent act to attempt to distinguish the case from Neal. The court rejected 
this distinction and held that the owner, as an "employer" who provided workers’ 
compensation insurance, was immune from the claim.
Notwithstanding L arkan , the distinction between being involved in an actual
negligent act and simply failing to maintain a safe place to work has retained some life,
although that may be accidental. In Simmons First N at’l. Bank v. Thompson. 285 Ark. 275,
686 S.W.2d 415 (1985), the Arkansas Supreme Court held that supervisory employees are
immune from a suit for negligence in failing to provide a safe place to work. The court, in
an opinion which like Neal relied on decisions from across the country, concluded that
since an employer is immune under the [workers’ compensation] 
statutes from a negligent failure  to provide employees with a
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safe place to work, this same immunity protects supervisory 
employees when their general duties involve the overseeing and 
discharging of that same responsibility.
285 Ark. at 278, 686 S.W.2d at 417 (emphasis added). To hold otherwise would "effectively
destroy" the immunity provisions of the workers’ compensation act. Id.
In Thompson, each defendant was a supervisory employee and moved for summary
judgment on the ground that "as supervisory employees" each was entitled to workers’
compensation act immunity. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirm ed summary judgments in
favor of the defendants but again found it important to note the lack of involvement of the
defendants in the actual accident:
None of the defendants was present at the place of the accident 
or had any active part in the work that caused the chemicals to 
enter the sewer. The complaint alleged negligence on the part 
of each defendant in failing to discharge his responsibility to 
make the premises safe.
285 Ark. at 276, 686 S. S. 2d at 416. The court in Thompson conducted a fairly  extensive 
review of the law and nowhere mentioned Larkan. Thus, in Thompson the court arguably 
appeared to retain or revive the distinction between a supervisory employee affirm atively 
committing a negligent act as opposed to one who merely failed to provide a safe working 
environment and was sued solely as an owner or supervisor.
But the pendulum swung back and the "involved/uninvolved" distinction again was 
ignored just two years later in Fore v. Circuit Court of Izard County, 292 Ark. 13, 727 
S.W.2d 840 (1985). In that case the supervisor was sued in tort for his alleged negligence in 
"keying a microphone, causing dynamite to explode. " Id . at 14, 727 S.W.2d at 841. This, of 
course, involves an actual a ffirm ative act by the supervisor as opposed to a mere failure to 
provide a safe workplace. Nevertheless, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of the 
defendant’s motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, concluding that the workers’ 
compensation immunity protected the supervisor. The court in Fore appeared to limit the 
right to sue the employer or a supervisor in tort to only those cases in which an intentional,
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willful, or malicious act was committed by the employer or supervisor.
That same year the Arkansas Supreme Court a ffirm ed a motion for summary 
judgment in favor of several defendant employees when the p la in tiffs ’ decedent was 
electrocuted when bare electrical wires came into contact with a metal hopper. Five of the 
six defendants apparently  had some management or supervisory duties; the sixth was a 
maintenance employee. The court concluded that the supervisory employees automatically 
were immune from suit and that the maintenance man also was immune because "failing to 
repair or check for bare wires involves fa ilure  to provide a safe place to work. " Allen v. 
Kizer. 294 Ark. 1, 6, 740 S.W.2d 137, 140 (1987).
While some cases have been allowed to proceed against fellow employees, those cases 
involve a co-employee who clearly is not an alter ego of the corporation or even a 
supervisory employee and the claim involves something more than merely failing to provide 
a safe place to work. In King v. Cardin. 229 Ark. 929, 319 S.W.2d 214 (1959), the p la in tiff  
was killed when a co-employee who obviously was not a high-level management employee or 
alter ego of the company struck and killed the p la in tiff  with a truck while they were 
working on a highway construction project. The court noted that the workers’ 
compensation act provided exclusive remedies against the "employer" and that a negligent 
co-employee "is regarded as a third  person" who may be sued in tort and is not protected by 
the exclusive remedy of workers’ compensation benefits. A jury  verdict in favor of the 
decedent’s estate against the fellow employee was affirmed.
King v. Cardin was cited with approval in Simmons First N at’l. Bank v. Thompson.
supra. However, in that case the court drew a distinction between Neal v. Oliver, in which
a tort suit was disallowed, and King v. C ardin , in which the tort suit was permitted, and
indicated tha t doubtfu l cases probably ought to be resolved in favor of the workers’
compensation act providing the exclusive remedy:
As we all know, the purpose of workers’ compensation statutes 
was to change the common law by shifting the burden of all
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work-related injuries from individual employers and employees 
to the consuming public. In that e ffo rt  the matter of fault, as 
Larson points out, is ordinarily immaterial. Employers were 
compelled to give up the common-law defenses of contributory 
fault, fellow servant, and assumption of risk. Employees were 
compelled to give up the chance of recovering unlimited 
damages in fault-related cases in return for a certain recovery 
in a ll  work-related cases. The p la in tiffs  here are attempting to 
re turn  to the common-law system based on fault, when it is to 
their advantage to do so, but at the same time to retain the 
assured benefits of workers’ compensation regardless of fault.
The invalidity of their position is too plain to require fu r ther 
discussion.
285 Ark. at 278-79, 686 S.W.2d at 417-18 (emphasis in original).
All of the above cases deal with claims in which the employee has attempted to sue a 
defendant who claims the protection of the workers’ compensation act’s "exclusive remedy" 
provision. That provision, however, also prohibits suits by a th ird-party  against any person 
whom the employee could not sue directly. The Arkansas Supreme Court has decided this 
precise question and concluded that such third-party  complaints cannot be maintained. The 
court concluded that the Arkansas General Assembly intended workers’ compensation to be 
an employer’s exclusive liability for an on-the-job injury and, accordingly, prohibited third- 
party suits seeking contribution from the employer as a joint tortfeasor for the employee’s 
injuries. W.M. Bashlin Co. v. Smith, 277 Ark. 406, 643 S.W.2d 526 (1982).
C. Indemnity From the Employer.
The above discussion focuses on a claim in tort for contribution due to the 
negligence or intentional acts of a fellow employee. Under some circumstances, the 
p la in t if f’s employer can be made a third-party  defendant, based not on its tortious conduct 
but upon its express or implied contractual agreements to indemnify the defendant. In C & 
L Rural Cooperative Corp. v. K incaid , 221 Ark. 450, 256 S.W.2d 337 (1953), the employer and 
the defendant had an express contract containing an indemnity provision under which the 
employer agreed to hold the defendant harmless in case of damages caused by their
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negligence. The court allowed that case to proceed because the claim against the employer 
was not a claim for contribution among joint tortfeasors but was based upon an express 
indemnity provision in their contract.
In many cases there may be no written contract between the contractor and the 
subcontractor. There may be, however, a work order or some other type of document which 
should be examined to explore the possibility that some express indemnity language may 
exist somewhere. I f  the parties to the agreement used a "standard form" or "fill in the 
blanks" form of contract, it very likely may contain indemnity provisions which neither 
party expressly considered at the time of contracting but which nevertheless are part of the 
contract.
But sometimes indemnity will be allowed even when the contract does not expressly
provide that right. "Implied indemnity" was recognized in Oaklawn Jockey Club. Inc. v.
Pickens-Bond Construction Co., 251 Ark. 1100, 477 S.W.2d 477 (1972). In that case, an
injured employee brought a suit against Oaklawn and Arkansas Power & Light alleging
negligence in failing to provide a safe place to work. Oaklawn filed a third-party
complaint against the p la in t if f ’s employer for indemnity. Significantly, the contract did
not have an express indemnity provision so Oaklawn was seeking "implied indemnity. " The
trial court dismissed the th ird-party  complaint but the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed.
Significantly, the court noted that
courts dealing with implied and contractual indemnity,
[citations omitted], ordinarily recognized that the contractor’s 
duty to indemnify the owner, under such circumstances, is not 
controlled by the Workmen’s Compensation law.
Id. at 1101, 477 S.W.2d at 478. The court found a policy reason for allowing implied
indemnity by noting that if the employee recovered damages against Oaklawn, then the
allegedly negligent employer would have the right to be reimbursed under its subrogation
lien for workers* compensation benefits paid to the p laintiff . Without recognizing the right
of implied indemnity, then the loss would fall on the more innocent party and the negligent
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employer actually would receive payment from the innocent third party. The court 
required, however, that indemnity, whether express or implied, could not be based on joint 
tortfeasor status but on an "independent duty or obligation owed by the employer to the 
third  party. "
Several years later, the court attempted to clarify the difference between joint 
tortfeasor contribution and express or implied contractual indemnity by noting the proper 
test: "Is the claim 'on account of’ the injury, or on account of a separate obligation running 
from the employer to the third  party? " Morgan Construction Co. v. L arkan , 254 Ark. 838, 
841, 496 S. W. 2d 431, 433 (1973), quoting Larson, Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 76.44. 
The court in Morgan affirm ed the dismissal of a third-party  complaint against the employer 
on the ground that it failed to plead an independent duty owed by the employer to the 
defendant which would give rise to an indemnity obligation.
PART 2: INSURANCE COVERAGE.
I.  THE 1986 COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY:
BACKGROUND INFORMATION.
Although all insurance companies do not o ffer general liability policies that are 
word-for-word identical, s tandard form insurance policies are the foundation of all 
liability insurance policies. Each general liability policy is to some degree "customized" to 
the individual policyholder by the addition or deletion of certain additional coverages or 
exclusions, with a corresponding variation in premium, but in many essential respects the 
insurance policies offered by the various underwriters are substantially and substantively 
alike.
This is because virtually all insurance companies’ general liability policies follow the 
standard form 1986 Commercial General Liability policy (hereinafter the "CGL policy"). 
That form was widely adopted throughout the insurance industry in that year. That policy
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form superseded previous standard form general liability policies promulgated in 1973, 
1966, and 1941.
II. SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE 1986 COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY
POLICY.
A.  Coverages.
1.  Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability .
The typical CGL form requires the insured to pay "those sums that the insured 
becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ' bodily in ju ry’ or 'property damage’ 
to which this insurance applies. " The Insuring Agreement also provides that no other 
obligation or liability to pay money or perform services is covered unless expressly or 
explicitly provided for by supplementary endorsements and payments.
"Bodily injury" is usually defined to mean "bodily injury, sickness or disease 
sustained by a person, including death resulting from any of these at any time. " Of 
particular concern to oil and gas producers would be insurance for claims for injury 
resulting from discharge of pollutants into ground water, the air, soil, or in any other 
fashion which could cause a physical injury to a landowner or some other person. The CGL 
policy, as will be detailed below, contains an exclusion specifically identifying bodily 
injury allegedly resulting from pollutants.
"Bodily injury" has been given a very literal interpretation by Arkansas courts. It 
has long been the rule that the "bodily injury" requirement "limits the injury for which a 
recovery may be had to a physical injury and does not include all injuries to the person or 
personal injuries. " United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Shrigley. 26 F. Supp. 625, 628 
(W.D. Ark. 1939) (husband’s claim for loss of services of his wife because of the wife’s 
bodily injuries was not covered). Claims for embarrassment, humiliation, mental anguish, 
and emotional distress also do not constitute a "bodily injury. " Rowlett County v. Western
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Casualty & Surety Co., 425 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. 1978). More recently, in a case argued on 
behalf of the insurance company by the author of this paper, an Arkansas federal court 
ruled that a sexual harassment claim by an employee against an employer, even if  proved to 
include nonconsensual physical contact, did not state a claim for "bodily injury" covered by 
insurance. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sky. Inc., 810 F. Supp. 249 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
At this point it may be appropriate to point out, especially for non-lawyers, that the 
courts which found that the acts described above did not constitute a "bodily injury" for 
insurance coverage purposes were not saying that the p la in tiff  did not have a viable lawsuit 
against the insured party. Rather, the courts were saying that the claims made by the 
p la in tif f  simply are not covered by the insurance policy and the insured is left on its own to 
defend the case and pay any settlement or judgment.
2. The "Occurrence" Requirem ent.
The CGL form usually provides that, "The 'bodily in jury’ or ' property damage’ must 
be caused by an 'occurrence.’" The word "occurrence" is usually defined as "an accident, 
including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful 
conditions. "
In several situations courts have seized on the word "accident" to find coverage 
excluded because the defendan t’s alleged conduct or the p la in t if f ’s alleged injury was not 
an "accident. " In a case which may have some analogy to certain kinds of landowner claims 
against energy companies and their subcontractors, the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that 
claims for trespass to land and conversion of crops were not covered by the defendan t’s 
liability policy because these alleged acts were not accidental. Likewise, insureds who were 
sued for pumping water from their land into a small drainage ditch which crossed a 
neighbor’s land and caused flooding also were not covered by liability insurance because it 
was not an "accident. " The Arkansas Supreme Court provided a defin ition for "accident" as
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"an event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation—an event that proceeds 
from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause, and therefore not 
expected. " Continental Ins. Co. v. Hodges. 259 Ark. 541, 542, 534 S.W.2d at 764, 765 (1976).
In the context of oil and gas production, it is easy to imagine how intentional acts of 
the site work or drilling personnel could go awry and have unintended consequences. If, 
however, the "occurrence" was not an "accident, " because the underlying act was done 
intentionally, then insurance protection is not available. Whether the lawsuit presents 
claims arising from an "occurrence" or "accident" may ultimately depend on how the 
p la in tiff  pleads the case in the complaint.
3.  The Punitive Damages Issue.
The Arkansas Supreme Court specifically has held that punitive damages are covered 
by an automobile insurance policy having broad coverage language. In Southern Farm 
Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Daniel. 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969), the subject 
automobile insurance policy provided coverage for "all sums which the insured shall become 
legally obligated to pay as damages... because of bodily injuries... and... injury to or 
destruction of property...." The Arkansas Supreme Court held that this broad language 
required the insurer to pay the punitive damages award as well as compensatory damages. 
This holding was reaffirm ed in California Union Insurance Co. v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas 
Co. 264 Ark. 449, 572 S.W.2d 393 (1978).
Some policies’ coverage clauses are distinguishable from those in Southern Farm 
Bureau and California Union and, thus, arguably a d ifferen t result should be reached. The 
policy in Southern, and apparently the policy in California Union, provided coverage for 
"all sums" which the insured "shall become legally obligated to pay as damages... because of 
bodily injuries. " In contrast, many policies state that the company will pay damages "for" 
bodily injury or property damage. Although it cannot be said with any assurance that an
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Arkansas appellate court would not find the distinction in language too minor to make any 
difference, there is certainly an argument to be made that the latter policy language covers 
only bodily injury or property damage and not punitive damages because punitive damages 
are not "for" the described losses of "bodily injury or property damage. " The policies in the 
other cases, again, provided coverage for "all sums" for which the insured became liable 
"because of" bodily injuries and property damage. At best, though, all I can tell you is that 
there is an argument to be made based on the difference in policy language; the general 
rule of law in Arkansas at this time is that punitive damages are covered by broad policy 
language in some policies, which may be distinguished from similar, though not identical, 
language in other forms.
This discussion concerns only the issue of initial coverage of punitive damages 
claims. A nationwide survey of cases considering whether punitive damages are covered 
under various forms of liability policies is found in Liability Insurance Coverage as 
Extending to Liability for Punitive or Exemplary Damages. 16 A.L.R. 4th 11 (1982 and 
Supp. 1993). In the following section on "exclusions from coverage, " policy provisions 
potentially excluding otherwise covered punitive damages claims will be considered.
B.  Exclusions.
The CGL contains a number of exclusions from coverage. An "exclusion," as the 
name implies, excludes from coverage a claim which otherwise would be covered. The 
CGL’s exclusions, in summary, are:
1.  Bodily injury or property damage "expected or intended from the standpoint 
of the insured. " This clause, though not expressly naming punitive damages in the 
exclusion, has the practical effect of excluding from coverage many, if  not most, of the 
kinds of acts and resulting claims which are the factual basis of a punitive damages prayer 
for relief. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sky. Inc., 810 F. Supp. 249 (W.D. Ark.
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1992). An annotation examining nationwide interpretation of this exclusion, including its 
use in excluding coverage for punitive damages, is Construction and Application of 
Provision of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Expected or Intended 
by Insured, 31 A.L.R. 4th 957 (1984 and Supp. 1993).
2. Bodily injury or property damage which the insured is obligated to pay 
because of the assumption of liability in a contract or agreement. Many contracts between 
prime contractors and subcontractors have "assumption of liability" clauses. If liability is 
imposed on an insured only because of a contract and not because that party would have 
been liable for the injury even in the absence of the contract or agreement, then the claim is 
excluded from insurance coverage.
3. Bodily injury or property damage for which the insured may be held liable 
because of causing or contributing to the intoxication of any person.
4. Any obligation of the insured arising under a workers’ compensation, 
disability benefits, unemployment compensation, or other similar law.
5. Bodily injury to a spouse, child, parent, brother, or sister of the employee if 
the in jury  arose out of and in the course of employment by the insured.
6. Bodily injury or property damage arising out of the "actual, alleged or 
threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants. " The word "pollutants" is 
defined as "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irr itan t or contaminant, including smoke, 
vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. " It is easy to see how many of the 
claims which may be made, particularly by a landowner, arising out of the drilling of an oil 
or gas well could fall under the pollution exclusion.
A number of policies, however, have a limitation on the exclusion arising when the 
discharge is "sudden and accidental. " The rationale is that a "sudden and accidental" 
discharge of pollutants is much more akin to the traditional type of accidental injury, 
whether to person or property, traditionally  covered by insurance. When that limitation on
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the exclusion applies, the exclusion would exclude coverage only for pollutants which are 
discharged or allowed to escape either intentionally or over an extended period of time.
For a detailed discussion of judicial interpretation of the pollution exclusion, see R. 
Chemers & R. Franco, The Contemporary View of the Pollution Exclusion—A Provincial 
Approach, Selected Issues in Insurance Coverage and Practice (Defense Research Institute 
1990).
7. Bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance, 
use, or entrustment to others of any automobile, a ircraft,  or watercraft.
8. Bodily injury or property damage arising out of the transportation of "mobile 
equipment" by an automobile owned or operated by an insured.
9. Bodily injury or property damage due to war.
10. Property damage to the insured’s own property. The rationale is that these 
items traditionally  are covered by (and paid for) other types of insurance.
11. Property damage to "your product" or "your work" and related claims.
C. "Additional" Coverages.
The CGL policy typically offers "additional" coverages for "personal and advertising 
injury liability" and "medical payments. " There often are "Supplementary Payments" 
available covering miscellaneous items like bail bonds, attachment bonds, prejudgment 
interest, etc. These coverages are not discussed because they are outside the scope of this 
paper.
D. Who is an "Insured"?
The "insured" is the person(s) or entity /entities designated in the "declarations" page. 
The declarations page also provides information concerning policy limits, policy periods, 
etc.
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If  the insured is an individual, typically the spouse is also an insured, but for both 
only with respect to the conduct of a business of which the insured is the sole owner.
If  the insured is a partnership or joint venture, all members or partners and their 
spouses are insureds, but only with respect to the conduct of the partnership’s or joint 
venture’s business.
If  the insured is a corporation, executive officers and directors are also insured, but 
only with respect to their duties as officers or directors. The stockholders also are insureds, 
but only with respect to their liability as stockholders.
The insured’s employees, other than executive officers, are also insured, but only for 
acts committed within the scope of their employment. Typically, this provision is limited 
by excluding coverage for injuries arising in the course of employment.
III.  THE INSURED’S DUTIES IN THE EVENT OF AN OCCURRENCE, CLAIM, OR
SUIT.
The insured has an obligation to promptly notify the insurer when a covered claim is 
made against the insured or a lawsuit which may be covered by the insurance policy is 
filed. Failure to do so may result in the insurer’s being able to disclaim coverage and avoid 
paying an otherwise insured obligation.
From the insurer’s standpoint, disclaiming coverage for breach of the duty to 
cooperate in the defense is a severe step, because a wrong decision can expose the insurance 
company to liability not only on the underlying claim by the injured party but also by the 
insured for a wrongful disclaimer of coverage. Nevertheless, under the proper set of facts 
the insured’s failure  to cooperate in the lawsuit can result in loss of insurance policy 
protection.
Perhaps the most frequently-occurring event concerning the insured’s breach of its 
duty to the insurer involves the topic of notification. An energy company, like any insured 
business, should have a firmly-established procedure for notifying its insurer of any
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possibly covered claim made against it. Furthermore, promptly notifying the insurer upon 
receipt of a lawsuit, as opposed to a nonlitigation claim, against the insured is even more 
vital. If the insurer is not notified in a timely fashion that the insured has been sued, no 
answer is filed, and a default judgment results, then the insurer may escape responsibility 
for paying an otherwise covered loss simply due to the insured’s failure to report the 
lawsuit. On the other hand, if  the suit is reported promptly to the insurer and the insurer 
or its defense counsel allows a default in answering to occur, then the insurer may become 
liable for the entire judgment entered against the insured, even if that judgment is greater 
than the insurance policy limits. The rationale, obviously, is that if  the insured defendant 
promptly reports the lawsuit and the insurer causes the default judgment to occur through 
its own neglect, then the insurer is responsible for not only the entry of the judgment but 
also the size of the judgment and, in fairness to the insured, the insurer should pay the 
entire amount even if that exceeds the policy limits.
IV.  DEALING WITH YOUR INSURANCE AGENT.
Arkansas, like most states, recognizes the distinction between a "general agent" and a 
"soliciting agent. " A general agent has the power to bind the insurance company to risks 
and to make contracts on behalf of the insurance company. A soliciting agent, in contrast, 
only has the authority  to accept applications and forward information and payments to the 
insurer. A soliciting agent cannot change the terms of an insurance policy or make any 
additional agreements. Jackson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 736 F. 2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 
1984); Hunt v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 21 Ark. App. 261, 267, 732 S.W.2d 167, 170 (1987).
It is a general rule of law that one who deals with an agent is bound to determine the 
scope of his authority. Hunt v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co., supra. When dealing with an 
insurance agent, it is crucial to establish whether the agent actually has the authority to 
commit the insurer to any undertakings. An insurer, however, may give its limited agents
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such an appearance of having authority to bind the insurer that the insurer cannot later 
deny the agent’s actions. This is the doctrine of "apparent authority. " Dixie Ins. Co. v. Joe 
Works Chevrolet. Inc., 298 Ark. 106, 110, 766 S.W.2d 4, 7 (1989). This doctrine, significantly, 
could also be used against oil and gas companies.
Furthermore, any "understandings" between the insured and its insurer should be 
reduced to writing so that there is no misunderstanding at a later, crucial time. If there is a 
misunderstanding, it usually will come to light only because a problem with a claim or a 
lawsuit has led to a conflict between the insured and the insurer.
Finally, as noted previously, if a lawsuit is filed against the insured the insurer must 
be notified promptly. Failure to notify the insurer may result in a loss of insurance 
coverage on the claim. But failure of the insurer to protect the insured’s interests when 
notified of the suit may result in the insurer being responsible for the entire claim, even if 
larger than the policy limits or subject to an exclusion.
V. INSURER’S "BAD FAITH" LIABILITY.
The whole area of insurer’s bad faith is a relatively new area of Arkansas law. For
years Arkansas has had a statute which provided for a twelve percent penalty and
attorney’s fees for a plaintiff prevailing in a "direct action" against an insurer on an
insurance policy. Ark. Code Ann. § 23-79-208 (1987). In 1983, however, the Supreme Court
of Arkansas specifically decided that this statute was not the exclusive remedy for failure
to pay a claim and did not preempt a "tort of bad faith" action against an insurer failing to
pay a claim. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d
463 (1983). The court in that case made the following statement:
[I]n order to be successful a claim based on the tort of bad faith 
must include affirmative misconduct by the insurance 
company, without a good faith defense, and that the 
misconduct must be dishonest, malicious, or oppressive in an 
attempt to avoid its liability under an insurance policy. Such a 
claim cannot be based upon good faith denial, offers to
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compromise a claim or for other honest errors of judgment by 
the insurer. Neither can this type claim be based upon 
negligence or bad judgment so long as the insurer is acting in 
good faith. We agree with the Ohio Supreme Court in 
Columbus Finance v. Howard. 42 Ohio St. 2d 178, 327 N.E.2d 654 
(1975), holding that in an action of this type for tort, actual 
malice is that state of mind under which a person’s conduct is 
characterized by hatred, ill will or a spirit of revenge. Actual 
malice may be inferred from conduct and surrounding 
circumstances.
The court in Broadway Arms did not find whether the facts in that case amounted to bad
faith. The court did find that there was a question sufficient to justify trial on the bad
faith claim when, among other things, the agent threatened the insured by stating that the
insurer might be called upon to explain to authorities why it paid $75,000 on a loss when
the insured’s books revealed that it had valued the inventory at $23, 000 for tax purposes.
an additional passage amplifying the tort of bad faith in Arkansas is found in a separate
opinion in Broadway Arms, which concurred in part and dissented in part:
The tort can only be based upon an affirmative action of 
intentional, dishonest, malicious, or oppressive conduct by a 
company to avoid its liability. Those are strong words, and 
impose a heavy burden on an insured, as they well should, 
because Arkansas has an adequate remedy for an insured 
against a company that either refuses or through nonfeasance 
will not honor its contract obligations. See Ark. Stat. § 66-3001 
et sea. (Repl. 1980). While good reasons for recognizing this 
cause of action exist, the tort should not be merely a new legal 
tool to collect attorney’s fees, or a means of intimidating the 
insurance industry so it cannot fairly and reasonably resist 
false, suspicious or even disputed claims.
That is the reason I characterized the new tort as outrage, 
because it better describes the kind of conduct that should 
result in punishment. Bad faith can be, in my judgment, 
interpreted by jurors as merely negligence, and this tort is not 
one of negligence—it is one of intentional, malicious, dishonest 
and oppressive conduct.
281 Ark. at 139-40 (Hickman, J., concurring and dissenting).
The separate opinion then went on to note that, although the court was not actually 
deciding the issue, the evidence against Aetna in that case "does not justify a finding that 
Aetna is guilty of such conduct. Negligence, and poor judgment, probably; outrageous
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conduct, hardly. "
Obviously, these statements from this leading case indicate that the insured has a 
heavy burden in succeeding in a bad faith claim against an insurer. Two later cases also are 
instructive in showing the kind of conduct that the Arkansas Supreme Court is concerned 
with in the tort of bad faith. There appear to be no reported Arkansas cases dealing with a 
"bad faith" claim by an energy company against its liability insurer. In Employers 
Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 282 Ark. 29, 665 S. W. 2d 873 (1984), the insurer cancelled 
the insured’s coverage after the insured suffered a heart attack, claiming that the insured 
had failed to pay his premium. The insured produced checks showing that all of the 
premiums had been paid. More significantly, the insurer’s payment records showed 
evidence of alteration. The court found that this was substantial evidence from which the 
jury could find that the insured had paid the premiums and that the insurer later 
fraudulently altered its own records to falsely show that the policy had lapsed for 
nonpayment.
In a 1985 case, the Arkansas Supreme Court did not express a definite opinion as to 
whether the insurer’s conduct amounted to bad faith but did remand the case for trial on 
that issue. In Thomas v. Farm Bureau Insurance Co., 287 Ark. 313, 698 S.W.2d 508 (1985), a 
state trooper testified that he was told by the insurer to "go out there and scare the people 
so they would settle" while he was conducting an arson investigation. The state trooper 
further testified that he wasn’t on so much an investigation as a "mission of intimidation" 
and that his investigation produced no evidence whatsoever of arson. A jury verdict in the 
insurer’s favor was reversed on the grounds that the trial court improperly excluded 
evidence that Farm Bureau violated the Arkansas Arson Reporting Immunity Act. 
Essentially, Farm Bureau did not make the required reportings to the state for suspected 
arson. The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in not admitting this 
evidence. The court found that the evidence was relevant to the question of whether Farm
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Bureau in good faith believed there was a possibility of arson or in bad faith was using that 
allegation against the insured to intimidate him in settling the claim.
In these and several other post-Broadway Arms cases, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
has not established a specific set of elements which must be met in order for a plaintiff to 
prove the tort of bad faith. Instead, each case generally describes what bad faith entails 
and then decides whether the facts of that case amount to bad faith.
PART 3: WORKERS’ COMPENSATION.
I. INTRODUCTION.
Arkansas workers’ compensation law recently has undergone a significant change. 
The original Arkansas workers’ compensation act was passed in 1948-49. A substantial 
revision of that act took place in 1975. There have been a number of amendments to the act 
since 1975, but the basic provisions of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act had been in 
place since 1975, if not in place since the original act in 1949.
In 1993, the Arkansas legislature found that the state’s workers’ compensation act 
needed substantial revision. Accordingly, the General Assembly enacted a number of 
substantive and substantial changes to the act. This revision was the most wide-ranging 
change in Arkansas workers’ compensation law since the original 1949 act and the 1975 
revision.
The 1993 amendments to the workers’ compensation statute apply only to injuries 
which occur after July 1, 1993.
II. TO WHOM WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DUTIES ARE OWED.
Under the new Arkansas act, every employer should "secure" compensation to its 
employees" to pay or provide compensation for their disability or death from a 
compensable injury "arising out of and in the course of employment without regard to fault
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as a cause of the injury. " Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-401(a)(1).
"Employee" under the new act is defined as
any person, including a minor, whether lawfully or unlawfully 
employed in the service of an employer under any contract of 
hire or apprenticeship, written or oral, express or implied; but 
excluding one whose employment is casual and not in the 
course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of his 
employer....
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(10). The definition continues to note that a sole proprietor or 
partner who devotes full time to the proprietorship or partnership is a statutory "employee" 
for workers' compensation purposes. Sole proprietors or partners are given the option of 
"opting out" of workers’ compensation coverage (and, as a probable result, of paying 
insurance premiums) by filing a certificate of noncoverage with the Workers’ Compensation 
Commission.
An independent contractor is not a statutory "employee" and no workers’ 
compensation liability is owed by the principal to the contractor or the contractor’s 
employees. A number of factors, including control of the method of performing the work, 
mode for determining payment owed, who is obligated to furnish tools, equipment, and 
materials, and the right to cease the employment without further liability are considered in 
determining whether one is an employee or an independent contractor. Purdy’s Flower Shop 
v. Livingston. 262 Ark. 575, 580, 559 S.W.2d 24, 27 (1977).
In contrast, a "subcontractor, " which is defined as one who takes a portion of a 
contract from a prime contractor, is responsible for securing compensation to its employees. 
But if the "subcontractor" fails to do so, the prime contractor is responsible for workers’ 
compensation benefits to the subcontractor’s employees. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-401 (1993 
Supp. )
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III. A "COMPENSABLE INJURY. "
A. Definitions and Criteria.
Only "compensable injuries" are covered by the workers’ compensation act. Under 
the new statute, a "compensable injury" means, in general, an accidental injury causing 
physical harm to the body arising out of and in the course of employment "only if it is 
caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence. " Ark. 
Code Ann. § 1 l-9-102(5)(A)(i).
Some physical conditions requiring medical care and creating a disability are in fact 
related to employment activities but are not caused by a specific accident and arise over a 
period of time. If this type of injury arises out of and in the course of employment but is 
not caused by a specific incident or is not identifiable by time and place, it still is a 
compensable injury if it is a repetitive motion injury such as carpal tunnel syndrome, a 
back injury not caused by a specific incident or identifiable by time and place of 
occurrence, or a hearing loss not caused by a specific incident or identifiable by time and 
place of occurrence. Id. at (2)(i).
Mental illnesses or injuries were given a substantially more restrictive definition, 
now being required to be caused by physical injury to the employee’s body (unless the 
employee was a victim of a violent crime). The section relating to mental illness or injury 
also places stricter requirements on the medical/psychological/psychiatric proof to be 
offered in support of such a finding.
Heart or lung injuries, including heart attacks, are compensable only if an accident 
is the "major cause" of the physical harm. Furthermore, the heart or lung illness or injury is 
not compensable unless it is shown that the exertion of the work necessary to precipitate the 
disability or death "was extraordinary and unusual in comparison to the employee’s usual 
work in the course of the employee’s regular employment or, alternatively, that some
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unusual and unpredicted incident occurred which is found to have been the major cause of 
the physical harm."  Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-114(b)(1). Subsection (2) of that statute adds 
that physical or mental stress shall not be considered. The phrase "major cause" means more 
than 50 percent of the cause, established according to the preponderance of the evidence. 
Ark. Code Ann. §11-9-102(14).
A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence, supported by 
"objective findings. " The phrase "objective findings" is defined as "those findings which 
cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient. " The definition goes on to 
specifically state that when determining physical or anatomical impairment, neither a 
physician, other medical provider, administrative law judge, workers’ compensation 
commission, nor the courts may consider complaints of pain or, for the purpose of making 
physical or anatomical impairment ratings, straight-leg raising tests or range-of-motion 
tests. The definition finally states that medical opinions addressing compensability and the 
degree of permanent impairment must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty. All these requirements are more restrictive than the Arkansas workers’ 
compensation law prior to the 1993 amendments.
B. Designated Noncompensable In juries.
Under the new Act, compensable injuries specifically do not include
(1) Injury resulting from a work place fight if the fight was the result of a non-
employment-related hostility.
(2) Except for innocent victims, injuries caused by horseplay.
(3) Injury caused by recreational or social activities. Presumably this is an 
attempt to cut back on the "company picnic injury" as being a compensable injury.
(4) Any injury inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services 
were not being performed.
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(5) An injury when the accident was "substantially occasioned" by the use of 
alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of the physician’s orders. 
The presence of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of a 
physician’s orders shall create a rebuttable presumption that the injury is noncompensable. 
Furthermore, that section of the statute provides that every employee is deemed to have 
impliedly consented to "reasonable and responsible testing by properly trained medical or 
law enforcement personnel" for the presence of any contraband substances in the employee’s 
body. If any of these substances is found, the employee is not entitled to compensation 
unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the substance did not 
"substantially occasion" the injury or accident.
IV. BURDEN OF PROOF.
The 1993 act also changes requirements concerning burden of proof. For an 
accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body, the employee shall 
have the burden of proving the claim by a preponderance of the evidence. This is in 
accordance with prior law.
For the repetitive motion injuries, back injury not caused by a specific incident, 
hearing loss not caused by a specific incident, mental illness, heart, cardiovascular injury, 
accident or disease, or hernia, the employee must prove the claim by the preponderance of 
the evidence and the condition is compensable "only if the alleged compensable injury is the 
major cause of the disability or need for treatment." Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(E)(ii). 
This is a substantive change from prior law.
V. LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION ABOLISHED.
Under the former law, judges were to construe the workers’ compensation act 
liberally, in favor of the claimant/employee. Under the 1993 revisions, workers’
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compensation judges and the Arkansas appellate courts shall construe the provisions 
"strictly." Ark. Code Ann. § 1 l-9-704(c)(3). An earlier amendment to the statute already 
had changed the act’s longtime requirement that the commission and courts resolve doubts 
in the evidence in favor of the employee to a standard requiring the evidence to be viewed 
impartially. The 1993 amendment seems to follow the previous amendment by changing the 
rules for construing the act as well as for reviewing the evidence.
VI. EXCLUSIVE REMEDY.
The workers’ compensation act provides the exclusive remedies available to an 
injured employee. If, however, the employer fails to "secure" the payment of compensation 
as required by this chapter (basically, by either purchasing workers’ compensation 
insurance or satisfying the commission and receiving permission to proceed as a self-insured 
employer), then the employer may be subjected to fines by the workers’ compensation 
commission and an injured employee has the option to proceed with either a workers’ 
compensation claim (with statutorily-limited damages but no requirement to prove the 
employer was at fault) or a tort suit against the employer (with potentially unlimited 
damages but a duty to show that the accident was caused by fault of the employer).
VII. CONCLUSION; NOT COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW.
The 1993 act was such a substantial rewriting of Arkansas workers’ compensation 
law that any comprehensive review would be voluminous. The author assumes that the 
employers attending the institute or reviewing this paper either have workers’ compensation 
insurance or, if self-insured, have a knowledgeable workers’ compensation claims 
administrator either in-house or on contract. Accordingly, for present purposes this paper 
attempts to cover only some of the changes in or continued rules related to basic liabilities. 
There has been no attempt to review benefits payable or procedural issues involved in
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making or defending workers’ compensation claims.
In the event that you or your employer has a workers’ compensation claim filed 
against it which is not covered by an existing insurance policy (in which case the insurance 
company would do its own claims managing), then in light of the new act it is imperative 
that a qualified workers’ compensation attorney be consulted. The "bottom line" is that 
assumptions and knowledge concerning workers’ compensation claims and Arkansas 
workers' compensation law which may have been valid for years may no longer be valid 
today. Any person either pursuing or defending a workers’ compensation claim should fully 
investigate the impact of the new law.
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